

Message Text

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ORIGIN ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 NEA-11 ISO-00 OES-07 DOE-15 PM-05 CIAE-00
INR-10 IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 EB-08 NRC-05
SOE-02 DODE-00 SS-15 SP-02 CEQ-01 AF-10 ARA-10
EA-10 EUR-12 H-01 NASA-01 OIC-02 PA-01 ICA-11
/173 R

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OES/NET:W. MOFFITT
DOE:B. MCFADDEN (INFO)

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 165175

FOR AMB WEST FROM ACDA ASSISTANT DIRECTOR VAN DOREN

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, TECH, SA

SUBJECT: SAUDI ARABIA AND THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
(NPT)

1. DURING OUR RECENT MEETING YOU REQUESTED THAT I PROVIDE
YOU WITH A SHORT SYNOPSIS OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION
TREATY (NPT), A LIST OF COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE ADHERED TO THE
TREATY, A LIST COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE NOT ADHERED TO THE
TREATY, AND MY VIEWS ON SAUDI ADHERENCE TO THE NPT.

2. SAUDI ARABIA DID NOT MAKE ANY STATEMENT DURING DISCUS-
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SIONS OF THE NPT AT THE UN IN 1968. IT ABSTAINED ON THE
RESOLUTION WELCOMING ADHERENCE TO THE NPT.

3. THERE APPEARS TO BE NO QUOTE ARAB UNQUOTE POSITION ON
THE NPT. NINE OF THE TWENTY ARAB LEAGUE COUNTRIES ARE FULL
PARTIES TO THE TREATY. THESE INCLUDE SYRIA, LEBONON, IRAQ,
JORDAN, LIBYA, MOROCCO, SOMALIA, SUDAN, AND TUNISIA.
EGYPT, YAR, PDRY, AND KUWAIT HAVE SIGNED BUT NOT RATIFIED
THE TREATY.

4. THE LAST TIME WE APPROACHED THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT WAS IN DECEMBER 1976. AT THAT TIME, OUR DCM DISCUSSED SAUDI ADHERENCE WITH MOHAMMED MADAN OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. MADAN TOLD US HE DID NOT KNOW THE CURRENT SAUDI POSITION. A FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSION WAS HELD IN JANURARY 1977 WITH NAJI MUFTI ALSO OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. HE DID NOT KNOW THE SAUDI POSITION EITHER, BUT STATED HE WOULD PASS OUR COMMENTS ON TO RIYADH. TO DATE, WE APPEAR TO HAVE NO DIRECT INDICATION OF THE CURRENT SAUDI POSITION. IN FEBRUARY 1978, IN REPLY TO A REQUEST FOR AN ASSESSMENT OF SAUDI ADHERENCE, EMBASSY JIDDA INDICATED THAT SAUDI ADHERENCE DEPENDED ON ISRAEL'S ADHERENCE.

5. I FEEL IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF NPT ADHERENCE WITH THE SAUDIS FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS. SAUDI ARABIA IS ALREADY EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF PURCHASING A RESEARCH REACTOR AND ENRICHED URANIUM FUEL FROM GENERAL ATOMIC AND WE PRESUME THEY WILL BE INTERESTED IN PURCHASING OTHER FORMS OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY FROM THE US. THE LACK OF NPT ADHERENCE WOULD BE A COMPLICATING FACTOR, MAKING IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO NEGOTIATE AND APPROVE AN AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION (WHICH WOULD FACILITATE US NUCLEAR EXPORTS); FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL

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CONGRESS TO APPROVE SUCH AN AGREEMENT; AND FOR THE NRC TO LICENSE ANY SUBSEQUENT EXPORTS. THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ACT OF 1978 IMPOSES A NUMBER OF CONDITIONS ON ANY SUCH AGREEMENT. TWO OF THESE CONDITIONS, IAEA SAFEGUARDS ON ALL EXISTING NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND RESTRICTING NUCLEAR EXPORTS TO PEACEFUL USES, ARE THE TWO MAIN OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES PARTY TO THE TREATY.

6. IN ADDITION, THE CONGRESS HAS AT TIMES MADE NPT ADHERENCE A FACTOR IN CONSIDERING OTHER ISSUES. FOR INSTANCE, IN APPROVING THE 1975 US-SPANISH BASE AGREEMENT THE SENATE PASSED A RESOLUTION INDICATING THAT AS COOPERATION BETWEEN THE US AND SPAIN INCREASED, IT WOULD BE EXPECTED THAT SPAIN WOULD ADHERE TO THE NPT. SAUDI ADHERENCE TO THE NPT AT THIS TIME WOULD THEREFORE REMOVE A POSSIBLE OBSTACLE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF US RELATIONS IN THE FUTURE.

7. THIRDLY, THE POSITION OF FIVE PERSIAN GULF STATES--KUWAIT, QATAR, BAHRAIN, OMAN, AND THE UAE--APPEARS DEPENDENT ON THE SAUDI POSITION. IF THE SAUDIS ADHERE, THOSE FIVE STATES MIGHT BE MORE INCLINED TO ADHERE. THE SAME MAY BE TRUE FOR A NUMBER OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, SUCH AS THE YEMENI ARAB REPUBLIC.

8. FINALLY, PRESIDENT CARTER HAS MADE NON-PROLIFERATION

A MAJOR ISSUE IN HIS ADMINISTRATION. SAUDI ADHERENCE WOULD THEREFORE BE VIEWED AS AN IMPORTANT ACCOMPLISHMENT OF HIS ADMINISTRATION--AS WELL AS AN INDICATION OF OUR MUTUAL COOPERATIVE EFFORTS AT PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL STABILITY.

9. I BELIEVE THAT EMBASSY JIDDA'S ASSESSMENT THAT SAUDI ADHERENCE IS DEPENDENT ON ISRAEL'S ADHERENCE IS LIKELY TO PROVE ACCURATE. I WOULD THEREFORE SUGGEST AS A FALLBACK
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POSITION THAT WE PRESS THE SAUDIS FOR A STATEMENT THAT WHILE NOT ADHERING TO THE NPT AT THIS TIME, THEY WOULD FAVOR OTHER NATIONS' ADHERENCE. IN THIS WAY, WE MAY REMOVE ANY LINGERING HESITANCY ON THE PART OF THE PERSIAN GULF STATES TO ADHERE TO THE TREATY AND ADD TO ISRAEL'S INCENTIVE TO ULTIMATELY ADHERE TO THE TREATY. AS PRECEDENT FOR SUCH A POSITION WE COULD POINT TO FRANCE WHO, WHILE NOT ADHERING ITSELF, HAS NOT OPPOSED ADHERENCE BY ITS FORMER COLONIES AND HAS SUPPORTED US EFFORTS IN SEEKING SOUTH AFRICAN ADHERENCE.

10. IN DISCUSSING THIS SUBJECT WITH THE SAUDIS I WOULD SUGGEST THAT YOU INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) THE US WOULD STRONGLY WELCOME SAUDI ADHERENCE TO THE NPT;

(B) IF THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT DOES NOT FEEL THAT AT THIS TIME IT CAN ADHERE TO THE NPT, WE BELIEVE THAT A PUBLIC STATEMENT THAT IT FAVORS ADHERENCE BY OTHER STATES WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE GOAL OF UNIVERSAL ADHERENCE FOR THIS IMPORTANT TREATY;

(C) WE HAVE RECEIVED INDICATIONS THAT A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES MAY ADHERE TO THE NPT DEPENDING ON THE SAUDI POSITION. SHOULD THESE COUNTRIES BECOME PARTY TO THE NPT AS A RESULT OF THE SAUDI STATEMENT, THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE MADE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO IMPLEMENTING THE NON-PROLIFERATION GOALS OF PRESIDENT CARTER AND THE CONGRESS;

(D) SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION WOULD BE WELL SERVED BY THE REMAINING GULF STATES BECOMING NPT
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PARTIES. THUS, ENCOURAGING OTHER COUNTRIES TO ADHERE TO THE NPT COULD DIRECTLY SERVE SAUDI INTERESTS;

(E) IN ADDITION, IT WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL IF THE SAUDI

GOVERNMENT WOULD MAKE POINT (D) PRIVATELY WITH THOSE STATES IN THE REGION WITH WHOM IT HAS INFLUENCE; AND

(F) TAKING THE STEP INDICATED IN POINT (B) AT THIS TIME WOULD NOT INVOLVE NEW OBLIGATIONS ON THE PART OF THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT, BUT WOULD BRING SAUDI POLICY INTO LINE WITH THAT OF EGYPT.

11. NEA AGREES WITH MY SUGGESTIONS AND HAS APPROVED THIS CABLE.

12. TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS:
A SHORT SYNOPSIS

-- ARTICLE I. NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES PARTY TO THE TREATY UNDERTAKE NOT TO TRANSFER NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES OR CONTROL OVER SUCH DEVICES OR TO ENCOURAGE THE PRODUCTION OF SUCH DEVICES.

-- ARTICLE II. NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES PARTY TO THE TREATY UNDERTAKE NOT TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES OR TO MANUFACTURE SUCH DEVICES.

-- ARTICLE III. NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES PARTY TO THE TREATY AGREE TO ACCEPT IAEA SAFEGUARDS TO VERIFY THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE TREATY.

-- ARTICLE IV. ALL PARTIES TO THE TREATY HAVE A RIGHT TO THE FULLEST POSSIBLE EXCHANGE OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY FOR THE PEACEFUL PURPOSES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY. NOTHING IN THE TREATY SHALL AFFECT THE QUOTE INALIENABLE RIGHT UNQUOTE OF PARTIES TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR PEACEFUL CONFIDENTIAL

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PURPOSES IN CONFORMITY WITH ARTICLES I AND II.

-- ARTICLE V. EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES TO PROVIDE TO NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF ANY PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS UNDER APPROPRIATE CONTROLS.

-- ARTICLE VI. ALL PARTIES AGREE TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH ON HALTING THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND ON A TREATY ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT.

-- ARTICLE VII. NOTHING IN THE TREATY AFFECTS THE RIGHT OF ANY GROUP OF STATES TO ESTABLISH NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES.

-- ARTICLE VIII. AMENDMENT AND REVIEW PROCEDURES.

-- ARTICLE IX. ADHERENCE AND ENTRY INTO FORCE PROCEDURES. THE UNITED STATES, THE USSR AND THE UNITED KINGDOM ARE

DESIGNATED DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS.

-- ARTICLE X. EACH PARTY HAS THE RIGHT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE TREATY WITH THREE MONTHS' NOTICE.

-- ARTICLE XI. PROCEDURES REGARDING AUTHENTIC -EXTS.

13. THE TREATY WAS OPENED FOR SIGNATURE ON JULY 1, 1968 AND ENTERED INTO FORCE ON MARCH 5, 1970. THERE ARE CURRENTLY 104 PARTIES.

14. REGARDING ARTICLE I, NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES ARE DEFINED AS THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE MANUFACTURED AND EXPLODED A NUCLEAR DEVICE PRIOR TO JANUARY 1, 1967, I.E., THE UNITED STATES, THE USSR, THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE, CONFIDENTIAL

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AND THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF CHINA. INDIA IS NOT CONSIDERED A NUCLEAR WEAPON STATEALTHOUGH IT HAS EXPLODED A NUCLEAR DEVICE.

15. REGARDING ARTICLE III, THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM HAVE VOLUNTARILY OFFERED TO PLACE ALL NUCLEAR FACILITIES UNDER IAEA TREATY SAFEGUARDS EXCLUDING THOSE WITH DIRECT NATIONAL SECURITY SIGNIFICANCE.

16. REGARDING ARTICLE V, THE US POSITION IS THAT ANY POTENTIAL BENEFITS FROM PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS HAVE YET TO BE DETERMINED.

16. NATIONS WHICH ARE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS OF MAY 1, 1978 ARE AS FOLLOWS:

AFGHANISTAN
AUSTRALIA
AUSTRIA
THE BAHAMAS
BELGIUM
BENIN
BOLIVIA
BOTSWANA
BULGARIA
BURUNDI
CAMBODIA
CAMEROON

CANADA
CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE
CHAD
REPUBLIC OF CHINA
COSTA RICA

CYPRUS
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CZECHOSLAVIA
DENMARK
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
ECUADOR
EL SALVADOR
ETHIOPIA
FIJI
FINLAND
GABON
THE GAMBIA
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
GHANA
GREECE
GRENADA
GUATEMALA
HAITI
HOLY SEE
HONDURAS
HUNGARY
ICELAND
IRAN
IRAQ
IRELAND
ITALY
IVORY COAST
JAMAICA
JAPAN
JORDAN
KENYA
SOUTH KOREA
LAOS
LEBANON
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LESOTHO
LIBERIA
LIBYA
LIECHTENSTEIN
LUXEMBOURG
MADAGASCAR
MALAYSIA
MALDIVE ISLANDS
MALI

MALTA
MAURITIUS

MEXICO
MONGOLIA
MOROCCO
NEPAL
NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND
NICARAGUA
NIGERIA
NORWAY
PANAMA
PARAGUAY
PERU
PHILIPPINES
POLAND
PORTUGAL
ROMANIA
RWANDA
SAN MARINO
SENEGAL
SIERRA LEONE
SINGAPORE
SOMALIA
SUDAN
SURINAM
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SWAZILAND
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND
SYRIA
THAILAND
TOGO
TONGA
TUNISIA
USSR
UNITED KINGDOM
UNITED STATES
UPPER VOLTA
URUGUAY
VENEZUELA
VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF
WESTERN SAMOA
YUGOSLAVIA
ZAIRE

17. BOTH CONGO-BRAZZAVILLE AND THE SEYCHELLES CLAIM TO BE
NPT PARTIES. WE ARE CURRENTLY TRYING TO CLARIFY THEIR
STATUS.

18. NATIONS WHICH ARE NOT PARTY TO THE TREATY ON NON-
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS OF MAY 1, 1978 ARE AS
FOLLOWS:

ALBANIA
ALGERIA
ANDORRA
ANGOLA
ARGENTINA
BAHRAIN
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BANGLADESH
BARBADOS (SIGNED, BUT NOT RATIFIED)
BHUTAN
BRAZIL
BURMA
CAPE VERDE
CHILE
CHINA (PRC)(NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE)
COLOMBIA (SIGNED, BUT NOT RATIFIED)
COMOROS
CUBA
DJIBOUTI
EGYPT (SIGNED, BUT NOT RATIFIED)
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
FRANCE (NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE; IN REFUSING TO SIGN, STATED
THAT IT WOULD IN ANY EVENT BEHAVE AS IF IT WERE A PARTY)
GUINEA
GUINEA-BISSAU
GUYANA
INDIA (ALTHOUGH IT HAS EXPLODED A NUCLEAR DEVICE, IT IS
NOT CONSIDERED A NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE)
INDONESIA (SIGNED, BUT NOT RATIFIED)
ISRAEL
NORTH KOREA
KUWAIT (SIGNED, BUT NOT RATIFIED)
MALAWI
MAURITANIA
MONACO
MOZAMBIQUE
NAURU
NIGER
OMAN
PAKISTAN
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
QATAR
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
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SAUDI ARABIA

SOUTH AFRICA

SPAIN

SRI LANKA (SIGNED, BUT NOT RATIFIED)

TANZANIA

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO (SIGNED, BUT NOT RATIFIED)

TURKEY (SIGNED, BUT NOT RATIFIED)

UGANDA

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

YEMEN (ADEN) (SIGNED, BUT NOT RATIFIED)

YEMEN (SAN'A) (SIGNED, BUT NOT RATIFIED)

ZAMBIA

19. THE STATUS OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IS
UNCLEAR. NORTH VIETNAM WAS NOT AN NPT PARTY; SOUTH
VIETNAM WAS. THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM HAS NOT
OFFICIALLY NOTIFIED THE DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS OF ITS
STATUS VIS-A-VIS THE NPT. WE CONTINUE TO LIST THE
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AS AN NPT PARTY. VANCE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 26 sep 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLICIES, NPT
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 29 jun 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE165175
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: ACDA/NP/NX:F. BUCHHOLZ
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: D780268-0492
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t197806115/baaazcc.tel
Line Count: 453
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Message ID: f7334f7e-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 9
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 29 mar 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2178445
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SAUDI ARABIA AND THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)
TAGS: PARM, TECH, SA
To: JIDDA INFO RIYADH
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/f7334f7e-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014